Georgia State University

ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University
Gerontology Theses

Gerontology Institute

Fall 11-14-2013

The relationship between the ownership of elder care homes and
quality of care in urban China
Yuanfeng Xu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/gerontology_theses

Recommended Citation
Xu, Yuanfeng, "The relationship between the ownership of elder care homes and quality of care in urban
China." Thesis, Georgia State University, 2013.
doi: https://doi.org/10.57709/4841602

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Gerontology Institute at ScholarWorks @ Georgia
State University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Gerontology Theses by an authorized administrator of
ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. For more information, please contact scholarworks@gsu.edu.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE OWNERSHIP OF ELDER CARE HOMES AND
QUALITY OF CARE IN URBAN CHINA
by
YUANFENG XU

Under the Direction of Heying Jenny Zhan

ABSTRACT
Traditional familial care has been challenged due to the reduction of family size and
increased mobility of the Chinese population. Institutional elder care is increasingly becoming an
alternative to familial care. This study explores the relationship between ownership of elder care
home and care quality, using data collected in 2010 from 157 homes in Tianjin. Two hypotheses
were proposed for the study: 1) There is a difference between government and non governmentowned facilities in facility characteristics; 2) Government-owned facilities have better care
quality outcomes. The t-test results showed that government-owned elder care homes had
advantages in economic resources, staffing and the availability of services. Government-owned
facilities reported lower mortality rate compared to non government-owned facilities. Multivariant regression analysis showed that economic resources—whether funding from the
government or high payments from care-recipients in private facilities--are important factors
predicting higher levels of care quality. These results indicate that the Chinese government
continues to play an important role in institutional long term care; in the meantime, private
market is increasing its prominence in the long term care market.
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION
With the increase in older population, the need for institutional long term care is growing.
The quality of care and quality of life in nursing homes are important to the growing long term
care needs of the elder population. In the United States, about two-thirds of nursing homes are
for-profit ownership with the other one-third being non-profit owners (Grabowski & Stevenson,
2008). In the United States, long term care is designed to increase independence of older adults
with chronic diseases and disabilities by providing assistance, and to provide medical care or
nursing care for long periods of time (King, 2000, p.2). Long term care can be provided in many
kinds of facilities, such as in a nursing home, a patient’s home or a community-based facility, to
help with patients’ needs in their activities of daily living (ADLs) or instrumental activities of
daily living (IADLs). Although long term care can include many forms of care services, the
primary focus of institutional nursing care is to manage residents’ major life activities, regardless
of whether medical services are provided in those institutions or not (Zhan, Luo & Chen, 2012).
In China, the “Yang Lao Yuan” shares some similarities to institutional care homes in America.
Although some research used nursing home to directly translate Yang Lao Yuan, Yang Lao
Yuan has broader meaning than nursing homes (Zhan, Luo & Chen, 2012). The Yang Lao Yuan
in China encompasses all kinds of long term care facilities which could provide assistance
services or place of residence or medical services, including facilities such as nursing home,
assisted living facility, continuing care community, retirement home, and hospice care center
(Zhan, Luo & Chen, 2012). Thus, the terms of “elder homes” or “elder care homes” that provide
wider connotation are more suitable to refer to institutional care in China. Research about the
relationship between ownership and quality of care may help policy makers with decisions in
financing, ownership change, or seeking other options in long term care (Grabowski &
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Stevenson, 2008). Furthermore, research can also inform elders who are faced with decisions
about choosing institutional care. In China, the development of formal long-term-care systems is
still in the early stages. Major sources for elder care had been government-owned elder homes
prior to 1990s (Wu, Mao & Xu, 2008). Recently, non-government elder care homes have been
increasing due to the economic transformation (Guan, Zhan & Liu, 2007); policy makers may
make decisions in public funding and design better supporting policies between the two types of
ownership of homes for the elderly. Furthermore, care quality may be associated with quality of
life among residents in elder care homes. Thus, it is important to understand the relationship
between ownership and care quality in the Chinese setting for policymaker as well as consumers
of long term care services.
The purpose of this study is to examine the relationships between elder care home
ownership and quality of care in the Chinese settings. The study begins by elaborating the history
of Chinese elder care. Then, a literature review is designed to define quality of care by reviewing
different instruments to measure this concept in previous studies. The literature review seeks to
first understand a more comprehensive way of measuring quality of care than has been done
previously in China. Then, a review of the literature examines existing theoretical and empirical
research about the relationship between elder care home ownership and quality of care in the
United States. Current research is contradictory. Some researchers have suggested that for-profit
organizations may have higher-quality care (Chou, 2002); while others argued that not-for-profit
organizations may provide better quality of care (Newhouse, 1970; Scanlon, 1980; Gertler, 1991).
However, little is known about the relationship between elder care home ownership and quality
of care in China. The aim of this research is to explore differences in quality of care among elder
care homes with different types of ownership in urban China.
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1.1

Background: The Development of Chinese Elder Care
1.1.1

Elder Care Pattern in China

The traditional care pattern for aging parents in China was familial care, which was
mainly provided by adult children due to norms of care obligation under the Confucian doctrine
of filial piety (Guan, Zhan & Liu, 2007; Zhan, 2011). Recent research showed that familial care
pattern continues to be a dominant pattern of elder care in China, and Chinese elders receiving
institutional care accounted for only 2-5 percent of all Chinese older population (Chu & Chi,
2008; Zhan, Liu & Guan, 2005). Filial piety or Xiao had been a mandatory principle in Chinese
Ancient Laws since the first dynasty----the Xia. Providing care to elderly parents has been a legal
requirement after the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949 (Guan, Zhan &
Liu, 2007; Zhan, 2011). If adult children fail to perform their filial duty under the legal
requirements, they could be published by 5 years’ imprisonment (Zhan, 2011). In 1996, the
government promulgated the law of “Senior Citizen’s Relative Rights and interests protection,”
in which adult children’s legal duty to support aging parents has more specific provisions (Zhan,
2011). With the traditional Xiao being sanctioned by mores and legal requirements, there was no
special public service for older adults who had children until 1990s. Government provided free
institutional care only for childless adults before 1990s (Chen, 1996; Zhan, 2011).
The pattern of care was influenced by living arrangement and differed between urban and
rural China. Most urban workers have stable pension and health care, and elders in cities tend to
live independently by themselves as long as they could (Zhan, 2011). However, intergenerational
co-residence is still a dominant living pattern, especially for rural families (Zeng et al., 2004).
The provision of care for aging parents is different by gender roles, and sons tend to provide
financial care and daughters tend to provide physical care (Zhan & Montgomery, 2003). Elders
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who have multiple children often could be taken care of by children taking turns or sharing
responsibilities (Zhan, 2002). In some urban families, if adult children are not available to care
for elders who need daily-care, they would hire a baomu (nanny) or a homecare worker to meet
their needs (Zhan, Feng & Luo, 2008). A baomu is usually a migrant from rural areas and most
baomus are female. They provide physical care and do some housing chores (Zhan, 2011). In
rural areas, sons are traditionally expected to take the major responsibility of taking care of aging
parents. The patrilocal elder care is still the dominant pattern, and elders are expected to raise
grandchildren in sons’ families and sons’ families are expected to take care of disabled elders
(Zhan, 2011). However, the urbanization is challenging the traditional pattern of familial care in
rural China, as large number of rural labors have migrated to urban labor market, and more and
more rural families have become “empty nests” where elders and young grandchildren are left at
home in rural areas (Silverstein et al., 2006). Although the middle-aged children who are
employed in urban areas could provide better financial support, they were less likely to meet the
needs of elders’ physical care. When adult children are unable to provide disabled elders, these
elders face dual difficulties of financial and physical dependency (Zhan, 2011).
1.1.2

Institutional Care Development in China

Recent research suggests that there is increasing needs for institutional care. First, elders
in urban areas are becoming more financially independent, and they may choose not to live with
their adult children (Xu, 1994; Zhan, 2011). In a study of urban interior China, nearly half of
elders who need physical assistance in their daily lives lived by themselves or with their spouses
(Zhan & Montgomery, 2003). This change of living arrangement suggests the increasing needs
for institutional care. Secondly, because of longer life expectancy and the one-child policy, the
only-child couples in a family are unlikely to be able to meet the needs of older generations
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(Zhan, 2011). The only-child couples would have heavy duty to take care of their elderly family
members from both families. Institutional care is likely to supplement familial care to help
reducing familial care burden. Finally, research has shown that the only children have less
willingness to sacrifice their work to take care of their elder parents (Zhan, 2004). There are
some disadvantages for only-child couples to provide traditional familial care. The only-child
couples lack siblings to share caregiving responsibilities. In addition, as women attain higher
levels of education, they are less available to stay at home to take care of elders (Zhan, 2011). To
conclude, these changes influence the current and future needs for institutional care.
Consequently, older adults who need assistance may be more likely to choose institutional care
than in the past.
Before social welfare reforms in the 1990s, institutional care in China was only available
for childless elders who had no income and no relatives (Chen, 1996). With the reduction of
family size and increasing rural to urban migration, the needs of alternatives for familial care
have gradually become more important for elder care since 1980s (Guan, Zhan & Liu, 2007).
After the 1990’s welfare reforms, some governmental elder homes have become privatized and
additional private elder homes have been opened by enterprises, organizations, and individuals
(Guan, Zhan & Liu, 2007). Because of economic reforms in the 1990s, former government
welfare institutions had transitioned from 100% governmental funded to partial or completely
financially self-reliant organization (Guan, Zhan & Liu, 2007). Welfare homes had to find their
funding resource and create income to meet their expenditures (Guan, Zhan & Liu, 2007). The
private elder care home industry in China is growing fast (Guan, Zhan & Liu, 2007). For
example, in the first 40 years of the people’s republic of China, from 1950 to 1990 Tianjin had
only six elder homes, and in the last 20 years between 1990 to 2010, it increased to 167 elder
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homes (Zhan, 2011). Most of these elder care homes are non government-owned or have been
privatized (Zhan, Liu, Guan & Bai, 2006).
With rapid growth of elder care facilities, quality of care has become a significant issue
for both care consumers and policy makers, in the context of China where government’s
ownership had dominated all services just two decades ago, the correlation between diversifying
ownership of care homes and quality of care deserves special attention.
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CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1

Theoretical Frame

2.1.1

Political Economy of Aging

To understand the quality of care and its correlation with the ownership of governmental
and nongovernmental elder care facilities, the theory of political economy of aging provides an
overarching theoretical framework in the Chinese text.
The political economy of aging is a macro-level theory that emphasizes the integration of
politics, economy, social environment, and personal experiences of aging in constructing old age,
aging, and social policy (Estes, 2001). Socioeconomic and political factors, not individual factors,
primarily determine the experience of aging, mainly including the structures of age, social class,
gender, and race (Estes, 2001).The theory drew from Marxist viewpoints of the complexity of
capitalism and how old age was socially constructed to meet the needs of the modern economy
(Estes, 1979). Estes and her colleagues (2001) state that the class structure primarily determine
the socio-economic position of older people in society. Their decreasing social economic status
can be explained by their decreasing social worth and productivity (Powell, 2001). Negative
attitudes toward older adults are more likely to form when they withdraw from the labor market
thereby reducing their income or social standing or both. Estes (1979, 2001) emphasized that the
state played an important role in social provision for the aged as highlighted by the political
economic theory. The state determines the allocation and distribution of scarce resources, and the
allocation of retirement and pension schemes (Estes, 2001). Phillipson (1982, 1988) argues the
reason that inequalities in the distribution of resources exist in the society is because capitalism
leads to social marginality of older adults in key areas such as welfare. From a Marxist
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perspective, inequalities refer to the distribution of resource within a society, not the variation of
individual.
Political economy theory of aging aims to explain how and why social resources are
unequally distributed, with a focus on how public policies reproduce existing forms of inequality.
The theory helps understand the differences between government and non-government elder care
homes. The pattern of elder care in China has been experiencing changes from the dominance of
familial care to the increasing needs and usage of institutional care, due to the development of
market economy. The elder care homes have also transited from absolute governmental
ownership to co-existence of governmental and non-governmental ownership. Do inequalities
exist in resource distributions for the aged by the state to elder care institutions with different
ownership? If so, what kinds of inequalities lead to the different care quality and life quality
among older residents? Utilizing the insight of political economy, this study examines how the
change of larger social environment from a socialist (or solo government-owned welfare
institutions) to a market economy may lead to the re-distribution of resources, which, in turn,
may lead to the differences in quality of care, and the personal experiences of aging.
2.2

Defining Quality of Care
In the United States, the quality of care in nursing homes has been a long-standing

concern of governments, the public, policymakers, and nursing homes (Arling, Job & Cooke,
2009). This issue has been studied for decades in order to establish standard of care practices in
all facilities (Grabowski & Stevenson, 2008). Many instruments for assessing care quality in
nursing homes have been proposed, but none of these has been universally accepted (Comondore
et al., 2009). According to Donbedian (1988), care quality can be conceptualized as three
components: structure, process and outcome, generally referred to as the SPO framework. The
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SPO framework was a popular model that has been applied for assessment of care quality in
healthcare systems (Goodson, Jang & Rantz, 2008).
Pay-for-performance (P4P) programs, which rely on performance measures and have
been operating in nursing homes in some states, used the SPO framework to assess care quality
in nursing homes. The pay-for-performance program is a financial incentive strategy to promote
care quality in nursing homes by rewarding care performance (Arling, Job & Cooke，2009).
Arling, Job and Cooke (2009) surveyed P4P programs in nursing homes of six states by applying
performance measures that referred to care quality in those P4P systems included “general areas
of structure (organizational resources and input), process (care practices and treatment), and
outcomes (impacts on health, function, and quality of life)” (p. 588-589).
Structure could be measured by staffing levels such as nurses’ skill levels and direct-care
staffing hours; care process could be measured by evaluating available services such as dietary
services; and care outcome could be measured by the impacts of the physical and mental care
such as pressure sores and satisfaction with their overall care (Arling et al., 2009). Though it is
widely used, the SPO framework was not regarded as a completely perfect model for measuring
care quality. Atchley (1991) added a time dimension to the SPO framework. Unruh and Wan
(2004) argued causal connection was lacking among structure, process and outcomes in the
framework, and the link among these three components should be taken into account in the SPO
framework, and structural equation modeling could be constructed to improve this model.
The Observable Indicators of Nursing Home Care Quality Instrument (OIQ) was
developed by qualitative studies, and dimensions of care quality were described from consumers,
providers and regulators through on-site visit (Goodson, Jang & Rantz, 2008). Rantz and his
colleagues developed a comprehensive model to define care quality in nursing homes, and seven
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dimensions were encompassed into the model, including “central focus of the agency is on
residents, families, staff, and community; care; communication; environment; home; and family
involvement” (Goodson, Jang & Rantz, 2008, p.4). Through a series of field tests in nursing
homes and analyses of the test results, OIQ was proved to be a valid and reliable instrument for
measuring the care quality in nursing homes (Rantz et al., 2006).
The SPO framework and OIQ instrument encompass relatively comprehensive and
extensive meaning of care quality. Another approach to care quality focuses on clinical quality
indicators just measuring residents’ health outcomes associated with care quality. A set of
clinical quality indicators (QIs), which were developed by researchers at the Center for Health
System Research and Analysis at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, has been utilized to
measure the residents’ health status in a facility (Goodson, Jang & Rantz, 2008). The Clinical
Quality indicators (QIs) mainly include pressure sores, physical or chemical restraints, and the
decline or improvement in activities of daily living (ADLs), mental status etc. (Arling et al.
2009). Even though the QIs were widely used to differentiate levels of care quality, it was
criticized for its flaws in accuracy and the validity of indicators (Harrington et al., 2001). Karon,
Sainfor, and Zimmerman (1999) established the QIs ranking to provide a quantitative analysis
for overall quality of nursing homes. In addition, Rantz and his colleagues (2004) established
classification of care quality level based on their individual scores on QIs, and the overall
classification for the facility (good, average, or poor) was determined by their individual overall
scores.
Residents’ health outcome is emphasized in direct measures of care quality in the federal
Medicare/Medicaid laws and state licensing laws. Under the federal Medicare/Medicaid Laws
and state licensing laws, quality of care in nursing homes has emphasized on the outcomes of
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residents’ health, including “activities of daily living, vision and hearing, and pressure sores”
(Gittler, 2008, p.267).
In some empirical studies, outcomes of residents’ health or clinic quality indicators are
applied to measure care quality by various items related to health status. Based on a systematic
review of measures of care quality conducted by Comondore and his colleagues (2009), three
types of measures are frequently used to measure health outcomes of residents, they are pressure
ulcer prevalence, psychoactive drug use (such as anti-anxiety, sedative, hypnotic, and
antipsychotic drugs), and physical restrain use. Pressure ulcers or bedsores referred to as
erosion of the skin caused by lack of blood supply or friction (Bowlis, 2009). The Institute of
Medicine emphasized pressure ulcers as an important measure to indicate care quality
(Comondore, 2009). Physical restraints can prevent residents from injuring, but can diminish
dignity of residents and increase risk of pressure ulcers and mental illness (Comondore, 2009).
“Antipsychotics are a class of medications used to treat psychosis” (Bowlis, 2009, p.12). Higher
use of antipsychotics would cause negative results such as suicide and pre-mature death, and
higher use of antipsychotics is associated with lower care quality (Bowlis, 2009). Mortality is
also used as an important indicator to reflect care quality. Chou (2002) asserted that quality of
care in nursing homes should be measured by negative health outcomes, but mortality was also
an indicator of care quality. Zinn, Aaronson, and Rosko (1993) found that higher mortality rates
are associated with lower occupancy rates of residents in nursing homes. Higher rates of all these
measures were associated with lower care quality.
To conclude, the SPO framework encompasses wide dimensions of care quality, but the
connections between dimensions are ignored in this framework. The clinical quality indicators
can directly reflect health outcome, which is the outcome measure in the SPO framework. This
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study uses the clinical quality indicators to define and measure quality of care, and then explore
the relationship among ownership, and quality of care after controlling for other factors. Because
the majority of existing clinical quality indicators are based on measures in United States and
untested in the Chinese context, four measures—mortality, pressure ulcers, physical restraints
and antipsychotics—were used to measure quality of care in this study, based on existing
database. Facility characteristics associated with residents’ health outcome are explored as well
as the relationship between facility characteristics and care quality.
2.3

Facility Characteristics Associated with Care Quality in Nursing Homes
From the structure and process measures in the SPO framework, facility characteristics

are important factors associated with quality of care could be determined. Structure measures
mainly include ownership, economic resources, and residents’ characteristics, and Process
measures mainly include staffing and availability of services.
2.3.1

Ownership

Ownership of nursing homes in the United States has been generally divided into forprofit and not-for-profit. In some literatures, they have different names such as investor-owned
and nonprofit nursing homes (O’Nell, Harrington, Kitchener & Saliba, 2003), as well as,
proprietary and nonproprietary nursing homes (Harrington, Woolhandler, Mullan, Carrillo &
Himmelstein, 2001). For-profit nursing homes may be owned by individuals, partnership, or
corporation, and not-for-profit nursing homes may be owned by church, nonprofit corporation or
governments (Grabowski & Stevenson, 2008). There are two types of ownership of nursing
homes in China: government-owned and non government-owned, with nongovernment
ownership having diverse types that includes community-owned, enterprise-owned, and privateowned elder care homes (Zhan et al., 2006).
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In the empirical literature about the relationship between ownership and quality of care in
nursing homes in the United States, there is a general understanding that non-profit nursing
homes provide higher quality of care than for-profit nursing homes (Harrington et al., 2001;
O’Neill et al., 2003; Grabowski & Stvenson, 2008). Harrington et al. (2001) analyzed the 1998
data from state inspections of 13,693 nursing facilities by using multivariate models and
concluded that investor-owned nursing homes provided worse quality of nursing care than notfor profit. Similarly, O’Neill et al. (2003) found that proprietary homes in California had
significantly lower quality of care than nonproprietary homes when examining the relationship
between profit level and quality in both two types of homes. Grabowski and Stevenson (2008)
examined the effects of “ownership conversions” (p. 1184) on nursing home performance and
found that nursing homes converting from non-profit to for-profit showed decreases in their
performances, and in contrast, nursing homes converting from for-profit to non-profit showed
general improvement.
Earlier research has indicated the diversification of different types of elder care home
ownership in China; however, there is a dearth of literature about the relationship between
ownership and quality of care in the Chinese elder care homes system. Zhan and her colleagues
(2006) surveyed 12 elder homes sites and interviewed 265 older residents in Tianjin city
focusing on attitudes of the elderly toward elder care homes. They found that government-owned
elder care homes had advantages in financing, staffing, and access to medical insurance. The
overall quality in government-owned elder homes was evaluated to be higher than non
government-owned homes. However, in this study, the quality of care in elder care homes was
judged just from facility characteristics based on staffing and elders’ evaluation. Quality of care
such as care practice and residents’ health outcome was not considered.

14
2.3.2

Economic Resources

Economic Resources mainly refers to organizational resources and input of nursing
homes and they could be identified as one of structure measures. Financial input would ensure
the operation and higher care quality of a nursing home. Financial input mainly refers to funding
resources and medical insurance. Some studies found that higher proportion of Medicaid
residents were negatively associated with nursing quality and staff levels (Grabowski, 2001;
Harrington & Swan, 2003). However, another study did not find that the percentage of Medicaid
residents negatively influenced outcome of care quality (Chesteen, Helgheim, Randall & Wardell,
2005). Furthermore, Harrington and colleagues (2001) found that the percentage of Medicare
residents could indicate higher levels of care quality in nursing homes.
In the study of Zhan and her colleagues (2006), only three elder care homes, among 12
elder care homes investigated in Tianjin, China, and was found to have established association
with medical insurance company, and the rest of elder care homes could not be medically insured.
Elders in un-insured elder homes could not receive the reimbursement for their medical bills and
hospitalization, and their access of medical services would be limited (Zhan et al., 2006). Lack of
medical insurance would understandably affect quality of care.
2.3.3

Residents’ Characteristics

Residents’ Characteristics refer to current residents’ information in each elder care home.
These characteristics mainly refer to their basic demographics, including payment source,
clinical and functional characteristics. In China, payment sources mainly include “out of pocket”,
“pensions”, “and welfare recipients.” Clinical characteristics refer to the prevalence of residents
with illness, such as dementia, which refers to their status when residents’ entered their facility.
The daily functioning refers to the three aspects of activities of daily living (ADL), including
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eating, toileting and transferring (Harrington et al., 2001). The proportion of residents needing
assistance in ADLs could be different in different elder care homes. In the study of 2009’s data
from elder care homes in Nanjing city, China, Feng and his colleagues (2011) found that the
level of residents’ needs for assistance in ADLs and the prevalence of residents with dementia
was significantly higher in non-governmental than governmental homes, and government
facilities had more welfare recipients than nongovernment homes.
The functional and mental health status of residents could impact on their quality of life
in homes and outcomes of care. Since it is difficult to collect clinic quality data in decline or
improvement in dementia and in ADLs, the different level of needs in ADLs when residents
were accepted by facilities could be utilized to predict care quality in elder care homes in this
study.
2.3.4

Availability of Services

Process measures of the SPO framework refer to the care practice and treatment,
including “resident rights, dietary services, and physical environment, or other services”, “scope
and severity of deficiencies in clinical care” (Arling et al., 2009). In the United States, the data
process measures are obtained from nursing home inspection data. Lacking of the inspection
data, regarding the provision of services, could lead to the deficiency of care practice and
treatment. Therefore, the information of availability of services could be an important indicator
of care quality. In this study, the availability of services is measured by the total number of
services among seven basic services in elder care homes, including accommodation, dietary
services, nursing care, recreation facility, medical services, rehabilitation services, and hospice
care.
2.3.5

Staffing
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Staffing was defined as overall staffing levels, number of staff per resident, and ratio of
registered nurses and unlicensed staff (Havig, Skogstad, Kjekshus & Romoren, 2011). Staffing
was emphasized as an important measure of structure within the SPO framework by the US
Medicare/Medicaid nursing home regulations (Comondore et al., 2009). In three literature
reviews of care quality in this field, researchers examined the relationship of staffing level and
the effect of registered and care quality by identifying quality indicators, and found that most
indicators were found to have significant positive association with staffing level and the effect of
registered staff (Bostick, Rantz, Flesner & Riggs, 2006; Castle, 2008; Spilsbury, Hewitt, Stirk,
Bowman, 2011). However, some studies did not find any link between staffing and care quality
(Rantz et al. 2004, Winslow & Borg, 2008; Arling et al., 2007; Berlowitz et al., 1999). For
example, Rantz and his colleagues (2004) investigated 92 nursing homes in Missouri and
collected reliable staffing data and did not find any effect of staffing level in relation of quality
of care. In this study, staffing was measured by percentage of trained caregivers, percentage of
migratory care staff, and ratio of professional physician to residents, ratio of professional
caregivers to residents, and staff turnover rate.
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CHAPTER 3 PURPOSE AND HYPOTHESES
3.1

Purpose of Research
The purpose of the proposed research is to explore the relationship between the

ownership of elder care homes and quality of care in institutional care settings of urban China.
The aim of this study is to increase the understanding of ownership-related differences in quality
of care in elder care homes. The four factors—economic resources, staffing, availability of
services, residence characteristics—are different indicators of care quality. Quality of care can be
measured by health outcomes of residents, including pressure ulcers, physical restraints,
antipsychotics, and mortality. However, in this study, only mortality rate is examined. Figure one
demonstrates the conceptual model of the study.

Figure 1: Conceptual Framework of Relationship between Ownership and Care Quality in
Urban Chinese Context
Two research questions were raised to explore the relationship among these
measurements: 1) Is there any difference in care quality between governmental-owned and non-
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governmental owned elder care homes? 2) How are those factors related to the outcome
measures between the two different kinds of elder care homes? Based on the literature review
and the two research questions, I proposed the following hypotheses corresponding to the two
questions above.
3.2

Hypotheses
Based on the two research questions, two sets of hypotheses are proposed.
Hypothesis 1: There is a difference between government and nongovernment elder care

homes in measures of facility characteristics, including economic resources, staffing, the
availability of services and residents’ characteristics.
Hypothesis 1a: There is a difference between government and nongovernment elder care
homes in economic resources: Government-owned elder care institutions are more likely to have
more economic resources.
Hypothesis 1b: There is a difference in staffing between government and nongovernment
elder care homes: Government-owned elder care institutions are more likely to have higher level
of staffing.
Hypothesis 1c: There are differences in the availability of services between government
and nongovernment elder care homes: Government-owned elder care institutions are likely to
have availability of greater number of services.
Hypothesis 1d: There is a difference in residents’ characteristics between government and
nongovernment elder care homes.
Hypothesis 1d (i): There is a difference in ADL level of residents received by
government and nongovernment elder care homes: Government-owned elder care homes are
likely to have fewer residents with ADL impairments.
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Hypothesis 2: There is an association between the type of elder care homes (government
vs. non-government) and health outcomes of care quality.
Hypothesis 2a: Residents in government-owned facilities are more likely to report lower
levels of mortality.
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CHAPTER 4 DATA, SETTING AND MEASURES
4.1

Data and settings
The city selected for this research is Tianjin, a municipality directly governed by the

Central Government, which is located roughly 120 kilometers east of Beijing (stats-tj.gov, n.d.).
Tianjin city has 14.5% of the total population that are 60 years and over by the end of 2003
(Zhan et al., 2006). Because of lack of specific definition of elder care institution, elder care
homes in this study are defined as those facilities that provide long-term elder care for older
adults.
The target population is all elder care homes located in urban districts of Tianjin. The
homes located in rural areas of the city are excluded. From the official listing of all registered
elder care homes in Tianjin, 157 homes were eligible to be surveyed. A survey questionnaire was
created according to On-line Survey Certification Automated Record (OSCAR) instrument in the
United States and was adjusted to adapt to the Chinese setting (Feng et al., 2011).
4.2

Measures
4.2.1

Elder Care Home Ownership

In the survey, the ownership of elder care homes is divided into two types: government
and nongovernment. Government elder care homes are divided into “City Government Owned”,
“District or County Owned”, “Street or Community Owned”, “Private Running and Government
Owned”. Nongovernment elder care homes are divided into “Individual Owned”, “Partnership
Owned”, “Enterprise Owned”, “Work Unit Owned”, “Foreign Investment”, “Church Initiated”,
“Charity Institute Owned” And “Other”. All government ownership elder care homes are nonprofit. Nongovernment ownership elder care homes include for-profit and non-profit elder care
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homes. Although there are many different categories within the types, this study focused
exclusively on the government owned vs. non-government owned distinction.
4.2.2

Quality of Care

Quality of care was measured by the prevalence of pressure ulcer, physical restraints, and
the usage rate of antipsychotics and hypnotic, and mortality rate. The prevalence of pressure
ulcer is defined as the percentage of persons who suffered from pressure ulcers. The prevalence
of physical restraints use is defined as the percentage of persons confined in bed or chairs to
prevent injuring in each facility. The prevalence of antipsychotics is defined as the usage rate of
tranquilizer (defined as the proportion of the number of residents who take tranquilizer).
Mortality rate was defined as the percentage of residents who died during 2010.
4.2.3

Factors Associated with Care Quality

Factors associated with care quality were measured by economic resources, staffing,
availability of services and residence characteristics. Economic resources were defined by the
acquirement of funding from government, including the total investment when established and
the proportion of government investment for establishment, the proportion of government’s
financial support for daily income, the proportion of daily income from charging residents, and
the amount of governmental monthly subsidies (the amount of subsidies of every bed per month).
The staffing level that is related to quality of care was measured by the percentage of
trained caregivers, percentage of migratory care staff, ratio of professional physicians to
residents (defined by the number of professional physicians divided by the number of residents
multiply 100), ratio of professional caregivers to residents (defined by the number of
professional caregivers divided by the number of residents), and staff turnover rate (defined by
the number of staff turnover divided by the number of staff in 2010).
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The availability of services was measured by the provision of the number of services out
of seven basic services in elder care homes. These services include accommodation, dietary
services, nursing services, recreation facility, medical services, rehabilitation services, and
hospice care. Furthermore, it is also measured by the number of total services.
Resident characteristics were measured by the percentage of residents with ADL
disabilities including feeding, dressing as well as moving.
4.3

Performed Analysis
The data was analyzed by using descriptive statistics to identify the characteristics of

elder care homes included in the study. To test the differences in the characteristics of
government-owned and non government-owned elder care homes, the researcher analyzed
economic resources, staffing, the availability of services, residents’ characteristics and care
quality measures in relation to ownership types. Chi-square and t-tests were performed to
understand the differences between government and government elder care homes with these
measures. Further, to understand the associations between ownership, facility characteristics, and
health outcomes of care quality, a multivariate regression analysis was performed by using these
variables: quality of care measured by mortality as dependent variables and characteristics of
organizations as independent variables. All statistical data was analyzed by using PASW
Statistics 18.
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CHAPTER 5 RESULTS
5.1

Descriptive Statistics
Organizational characteristics are presented in Table 1. Among the total sample of 157

elder care homes, there were 20 government-owned elder care homes consisting approximately
12.7%. The majority (65.8%) of all elder care homes were established after the year of 2000.
Among non government-owned elder care homes, 70.1% were established after 2000, compared
to only 40.0 % of government ownership. However, 40% of government-owned elder care
homes were established before 1990, compared with 1.7% of nongovernment. Therefore, most of
non-government owned facilities were built within the last ten years. The average number of
beds per home among the whole sample is 109.8, and the average occupancy rate was about
78.4%. Nineteen percent of all elder care homes are under expansion.
5.2

Statistics Results for Hypothesis 1
To understand the differences between governmental and nongovernmental elder care

facilities, multiple t-tests were performed for continuous dependent variables and chi-square tests
were performed for categorical dependent variables.
Hypothesis 1: There is a difference between government and nongovernment elder care
homes in measures of facility characteristics, including economic resources, staffing, the
availability of services and residence characteristics.
Hypothesis 1a: There is a difference between government and nongovernment elder care
homes in economic resources: Government-owned elder care institutions are more likely to have
more economic resources.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics：Organizational Characteristic and Comparison of Means
Ownership
Whole Sample (n=157)

Organization
Year of
Establishment >=2000
Year of Establishment
1990-1999
Year of
Establishment<1990
Total Number of Beds
Occupancy Rate
Under Expansion
Owned by Government
Hospital Based

Mean

%

104

65.8

96

70.1

8

41

25.9

37

27.0

12

7.6

4

1.7

30
20
11

19.0
12.7
7.0

85.3
20.9

104.0
76.5

Std.

Government Owned
(n=20)
N
%
Mean

N

109.8
78.4

Std.

Non government-owned
(n=137)
N
%
Mean

T/F Value

P.

40.0

7.058

.008**

4

20.0

.444

.505

8

40.0

33.724

.000***
.025*
.000***
.473
.574

80.4
21.1

149.8
91.0

Std.

107.5
14.4

25

18.2

5

25.0

-2.270
-3.904
.515

9

6.6

2

10.0

.315

Note: “N” represents frequency, “ %” represents percentage, and “std.” represents standard deviation. For continuous measure, value comes from
T-test; for binary measures, value comes from Chi-square test. Ownership was coded by “0” and “1”: 0 represents Nongovernment Ownership and
1 represents Government Ownership.
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To understand differences in economic resources between governmental and nongovernmental elder care homes, five measures as previously mentioned were used. Table 2
displays the T-test results. As shown in Table 2, government-owned homes had more average
investment funding, compared to non government-owned facilities (4.7 million RMB vs. 1.0
million RMB, P.=.000, p<.001). Government-owned facilities report higher average proportion
of government investment when established than non government-owned homes (83.1% vs.
3.4%, P. =.000, p<.001). In terms of the average proportion of daily income, non governmentowned homes reported higher proportion from charging residents, in comparison of governmentowned facilities (95.8% vs. 66.0%, P.=.000, p<.01). Government-owned homes had higher
proportions of government’s financial support for daily income, compared to non governmentowned facilities (30.2% vs. 1.9%, P.=.000, p <.001). Among homes received monthly
government subsidies, government-owned elder care facilities have higher average amount of
subsidies of every bed per month than non government-owned homes (60.5 RMB vs. 49.3 RMB,
P.=.001, p<.01).
Hypothesis 1b: There is a difference in staffing between government and nongovernment
elder care homes: Government-owned elder care institutions are more likely to have higher level
of staffing.
To understand differences in staffing between governmental and nongovernmental
organizations, five measures were used in comparative analysis. Table 3 shows the detail of the
result. Government-owned facilities, however, had significantly higher ratio of professional
physicians to residents and ratio of professional caregivers to residents, higher percentage of
trained caregivers than non government-owned homes (1.5% vs. 0.7%, p <.05; 13.6% vs. 9.8%,
p <.05; 83.1% vs. 61.6%, p<.01).
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Table 2: Bivariate Result: Ownership VS. Economic Resources
Ownership
Whole Sample (n=157)
N
Economic Resources
Total Investment When
Established (million RMB)
Government Investment
(%)
Daily Income-----Charging
from residents (%)
Daily Income----Government’s Financial
Support (%)
The Amount of Subsidies
for Every Bed(RMB)

%

Non government-owned
(n=137)
N
%
Mean

Std.

Government Owned
(n=20)
N
%
Mean

Mean

Std.

Std.

T/F Value

P.

1.4

3.6

1.0

2.8

4.7

6.8

-3.970

.000***

11.6

31.5

3.4

17.5

83.1

35.6

-14.628

.000***

92.1

19.3

95.8

10.2

66.0

39.7

7.290

.000***

5.4

16.4

1.9

5.8

30.2

36.2

-8.495

.000***

49.3

4.4

60.5

21.0

-.3.525

.001**

Note: “N” represents frequency, “ %” represents percentage, and “std.” represents standard deviation. For continuous measure, value comes from
T-test; for binary measures, value comes from Chi-square test. Ownership was coded by “0” and “1”: 0 represents Nongovernment Ownership and
1 represents Government Ownership.
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Table 3: Bivariate Result: Ownership VS. Staffing level
Ownership
Whole Sample (n=157)
N
Staffing Level
Ratio of Professional
Caregivers to Residents
*100(%)
Ratio of Professional
Physicians to Residents
*100(%)
Trained Carers (%)
% Migratory Care Staff
Turn-Over Rate of Staff (%)

%

Non government-owned
(n=137)
N
%
Mean

Std.

Government Owned
(n=20)
N
%
Mean

T/F Value

P.

7.5

-2.101

.037*

1.5

2.2

-2.348

.020*

83.1
2.0
2.7

29.1
4.8
4.6

-2.983
3.285
2.527

.006**
.002**
.013*

Mean

Std.

10.3

7.7

9.8

7.6

13.6

0.8

1.5

0.7

1.2

64.4
6.4
6.3

35.4
12.5
13.7

61.6
7.1
6.8

35.5
13.1
14.5

Std.

Note: “N” represents frequency, “ %” represents percentage, and “std.” represents standard deviation. For continuous measure, value comes from
T-test; for binary measures, value comes from Chi-square test. Ownership was coded by “0” and “1”: 0 represents Nongovernment Ownership and
1 represents Government Ownership.
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Non government-owned facilities had slightly higher proportion of migratory direct-care staff
and higher turn-over rate of staff in 2010 compared to non government-owned homes (7.1% vs.
2.0 %, p< .01; 6.8% vs. 2.7%, p<.05),
Hypothesis 1c: There are differences in the availability of services between government
and nongovernment elder care homes: Government-owned elder care institutions are more likely
to have higher availability of services.
Table 4 shows the measurements of available services. As shown in Table 4, all the
investigated elder care homes provided accommodation and dietary services. There were no
significant differences in the provision of recreation facility, medical services, rehabilitation
services and hospice services between two types of facilities. More non government-owned
facilities had nursing services, compared to non government-owned homes (99.3% vs.90.0%,
P.=.005, p<.01). Government-owned facilities had higher average number of total services than
non government-owned facilities (6.1 vs. 5.6, P.=.015, p<.05).
Hypothesis 1d: There is a difference in residents’ characteristics between government
and nongovernment elder care homes.
Hypothesis 1d (i): There is a difference in ADL level of residents received in government
and nongovernment elder care homes: Government-owned elder care homes are likely to have
fewer residents with ADL impairment.
The bivariate results of ownership and residents’ characteristics are presented in Table 5.
No significant differences are found in the percentage of residents that need help in feeding
dressing and transferring between these two types of facilities. Thus, the hypothesis 1d(i) was
rejected. Two measures, needing help with feeding (P=.053) and movement (P=.063), are at
marginal, yet not statistically significant, levels, indicating government-owned facilities, may
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have residents who were less likely to need feeding and assistance with movement. These
findings deserve more attention in future research.
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Table 4: Bivariate Result: Ownership VS. Availability of Services
Ownership
Whole Sample (n=158)
Mean

Std.

Non government-owned
(n=137)
N
%
Mean

Std.

Government Owned
(n=20)
N
%
Mean

N

%

Std.

T/F Value

P.

Accommodation (%)

157

100

137

100

20

100

Dietary Services（%）

157

100

137

100

20

100

Nursing Services（%）

154

98.1

136

99.3

18

90.0

8.002

.005**

Recreation Facility (%)

139

88.5

119

86.9

20

100

2.968

.085

Medical Services (%)

76

48.4

61

44.5

15

75.0

6.904

.011*

Recovery Services (%)

86

54.8

72

52.6

14

70.0

2.144

.143

Hospice Care (%)

121

77.1

105

76.6

16

84.2

.549

.459

-2.468

.015*

Availability of Services

Number of Services

5.6

0.9

6.1

1.2

Note: “N” represents frequency, “%” represents percentage, and “std.” represents standard deviation. For continuous measure, value comes from
T-test; for binary measures, value comes from Chi-square test. Ownership was coded by “0” and “1”: 0 represents Nongovernment Ownership and
1 represents Government Ownership.
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Table 5: Bivariate Result: Ownership VS. Resident Characteristics
Ownership
Whole Sample (n=157)

N
Resident Characteristics
% of Residents that Need
Feeding
% of Residents that Need
Dressing
% of Residents that Need
Help with Moving

%

Non government-owned
(n=137)

Mean

Std.

25.8

N

%

Government Owned
(n=20)

Mean

Std.

22.2

26.9

57.3

26.4

57.4

25.7

N

%

Mean

Std.

T/F Value

P.

22.8

18.4

16.7

2.009

.053

58.3

25.2

50.6

33.3

1.212

.228

58.9

24.9

47.6

29.0

1.843

.067

Note: “N” represents frequency, “%” represents percentage, and “std.” represents standard deviation. For continuous measure, value comes from
T-test; for binary measures, value comes from Chi-square test. Ownership was coded by “0” and “1”: 0 represents Nongovernment Ownership and
1 represents Government Ownership.
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5.3

Statistics Results for Hypothesis 2
Hypothesis 2 is proposed to test the association between different types of ownership of

the facility and care quality as measured by mortality rate.
A t-test was performed to understand the differences in four measures of care quality
between government-owned and non government-owned facilities. As shown in Table 6, no
significant difference was found in the prevalence of pressure ulcer, physical restrain use and
using tranquilizer between these two types of facilities. A major difference was found in
mortality rate: non government-owned homes showed significantly higher mortality rate than
government-owned homes in 2010 (11.1% vs. 4.0%, Sig. =.000, p<.001).
To further understand the relationship between ownership and care quality, a multiple
regression analysis was conducted to understand the influence of ownership on the outcome
measure of care quality. Since three measures showed no statistical significance at bi-variate
level, only mortality rate was selected as the dependent variable, and five groups of facility
characteristics were utilized as independent variables, including organizations characteristics
(ownership), economic resources, staffing, the availability of services, and residents’
characteristics. Because mortality rate was a continuous variable, Ordinary Least Square (OLS)
regression analysis was utilized to understand the influence of five groups of independent
variables in mortality rate. Five regression models were used to assess the relationship between
ownership and mortality rate. To optimize the models, variables that were not found statistically
significantly in previous t-tests, were removed from further analysis in the five models of
regression analysis. The remaining variables were selected and entered in five different steps in
five groups to allow a conceptual understanding of how each group of variables influence
mortality rate between government and non-government elder care facilities (see Table 7).
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In Table 7, Model 1 showed that ownership, or government owned facilities was
negatively related to mortality rate, but this correlation was not statistically significant (R2=.011,
P=.434). Model 2, 3, 4, and 5 showed that each group of variable, when entered into the equation,
increased explained variance and was statistically significant. Model 2, economic resources, was
shown to be the stronger predictor for mortality rate. This group of variable explained 36% of
variance. In Model 5, when the percentage of residents with ADL disabilities was added into the
equation, it increased the explained variation of mortality by 13% compared to Model 2.
Facilities that received lower proportion of daily income from residents had lower level of
mortality rate. The proportion of government’s financial support for daily income (Model 5, B=.492, p< .05) showed negative and moderate significance in association with mortality rate: the
less financial support facilities receive the highest mortality rate. Facilities that receive higher
levels of government support for daily income had lower mortality rate. Ownership, per se,
showed no statistical significance in mortality rate in all 5 Models.
To Conclude (See Table 8), hypothesis 1 examined the difference between government
and nongovernment elder care homes in measures of facility characteristics, including economic
resources, staffing, availability of services and residence characteristics. Findings in this study
supported hypothesis 1a, 1b and 1c, and 1d was rejected.
Hypothesis 1a hypothesized that there was a difference between government and
nongovernment elder care homes in economic resources: Government-owned elder care
institutions were more likely to have more economic resources. Specifically these differences are
shown in total amount of investment at the time of establishment, percentage of government
investment, and the percentage of government financial support as daily income. Government
funded elder care home were receiving more subsidies for every bed.
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Hypothesis 1b examined staffing differences between government and non-government
elder care homes. It was hypothesized that there was a difference in staffing between government
and nongovernment elder care homes: Government-owned elder care institutions were more
likely to have higher level of staffing. Staffing was examined by five indicators, two examined
staff (professional caregivers and professional physicians) and resident ratio; three examined
qualitative differences in staffs, including percentage of trained staff which indicates better
quality, percentage of migratory staff which suggests poor quality due to lack of training and
stability, and turn-over rate which is often an indicator of quality of care. Findings revealed that
overall, government funded elder care homes were more likely to have higher staff-to-resident
ratio, and better quality of staffs, and lower turn-over rate. Hypothesis 1b is therefore supported.
Hypothesis 1c stated that there were differences in the availability of services between
government and nongovernment elder care homes: Government-owned elder care institutions are
likely to have availability of greater number of services. Findings showed that government
funded elder care homes had an average of 6 services available (p<.05) compared to 5 in nongovernment funded elder care homes. This hypothesis is supported.
Hypothesis 1d examined the difference in ADL level of residents received by government
and nongovernment elder care homes. It was hypothesized that government-owned elder care
homes are likely to have fewer residents with ADL impairments. From previous study in China
(Feng, et al., 2011), governmental elder care homes tended to have fewer residents with needs in
ADLs than nongovernmental homes, which means governmental elder care homes accept
healthier residents and the quality of care will be affected by the characteristics of residents. In
this study, findings showed that no difference was shown in the percentage of residents that need
feeding, dressing and help in moving. Therefore, hypothesis 1d is rejected.
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Hypothesis 2 was designed to examine if there is an association between the type of elder
care homes (government vs. non-government) and health outcomes of care quality (the
prevalence of pressure ulcer, the prevalence of physical restrain use, the prevalence of taking
hypnotic, the prevalence of taking tranquilizer and mortality rate). The mortality rate was used as
a representative measure of health outcomes through a t-test between ownership and care quality.
The relationship between ownership and mortality was examined by a regression analysis in
hypothesis 2a: Residents in government-owned facilities are more likely to report lower levels of
mortality. Finding showed that two variables in economic resources—the proportion of daily
income from residents’ fee and the proportion of government’s financial support for daily
income—highly predict mortality rate.
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Table 6: Bivariate Result: Results Ownership VS. Care Quality
Ownership
Whole Sample (n=157)
N
Care Quality
The Prevalence of Pressure
Ulcer (%)
The Prevalence of Physical
Restrain Use (%)
The Prevalence of Taking
Tranquilizer (%)
Mortality Rate (%)

%

Non government-owned
(n=137)
N
%
Mean

Std.

Government Owned
(n=20)
N
%
Mean

Mean

Std.

Std.

T/F Value

P.

.3

1.0

.4

1.1

.1

.3

1.983

.050

5.3

11.1

4.7

9.2

9.4

19.6

-1.787

.076

2.3

4.8

2.4

5.0

1.9

3.1

.536

.596

10.2

17.4

11.1

18.4

4.0

3.7

3.949

.000***

Note: “N” represents frequency, “%” represents percentage, and “std.” represents standard deviation. For continuous measure, value comes from
T-test; for binary measures, value comes from Chi-square test. Ownership was coded by “0” and “1”: 0 represents Nongovernment Ownership and
1 represents Government Ownership.
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Table 7: Multiple Regression Results for Variables Predicting Care Quality
Predictor Variables

Standardized Coefficientsb
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4

Model 1
Model 5
Organizational Characteristics
Ownership
-.10
-.08
-.12
-.14
-.10
Economic Resources
The total amount of Government’s Investment for Establishment
-.06
-.14
-.15
-.09
The Proportion of Government’s Financial for Establishment
.02
.12
.13
.12
The Proportion of Daily Income from Residents’ Fees
-.71***
-.67***
-.67***
-.76***
The Proportion of Government’s Financial Support for Daily Income
-.38**
-.36*
-.35*
-.49**
The Amount of Subsidies of Per Bed
.05
.03
.03
.04
Staffing
Percentage of Trained Caregivers
-.11
-.00
Ratio of Professional Caregivers to Residents
.23
.06
Ratio of Professional Physicians to Residents
.00
.01
Percentage of Migratory Care Staff
.01
.00
Turnover Rate
.20
.16
The Availability of Services
The Number of Services
.04
-.02
Resident’s Characteristics
Percentage Sum of Residents with ADLs
.23
Constant
11.77
95.05
88.47
83.72
93.06
R
.10
-.60
.66
.66
.68
R Square
.01
.36
.43
.43
.46
R Square Change
.01
.35
.06
.00
.03
ANOVA P.
.434
.000
.002
.003
.002
Note: Significant levels: * p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001(two-tailed test). Ownership was coded by “0” and “1”: 0 represents Nongovernment
Ownership and 1 represents Government Ownership.
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Table 8: Summary of Hypotheses
Hypothesis 1: There is a difference between government and nongovernment elder care homes in measures of facility characteristics,
including economic resources, staffing, availability of services and residence characteristics.
Mean
Measures
Findings
NonGov.
Gov.
Hypothesis 1a: There is a difference between
government and nongovernment elder care
homes in economic resources: Governmentowned elder care institutions are more likely to
have more economic resources.

Hypothesis 1b: There is a difference in staffing
between government and nongovernment elder
care homes: Government-owned elder care
institutions are more likely to have higher level
of staffing.

Hypothesis 1c: There are differences in the
availability of services between government and
nongovernment elder care homes: Governmentowned elder care institutions are likely to have
availability of greater number of services.

Total Investment When Established
(million RMB)

1.0

4.7

Supported(p<.001)

Government Investment (%)

3.4

83.3

Supported(p<.001)

Daily Income-----Government’s
Financial Support (%)

1.9

30.2

Supported(p<.001)

Daily Income-----Charging from
residents (%)

95.8

66.0

Supported(p<.001)

The Amount of Subsidies of Every
Bed(RMB)

49.3

60.5

Supported(p<.01)

Ratio of Professional Caregivers to
Residents *100(%)

9.8

13.6

Supported(p<.05)

Ratio of Professional Physicians to
Residents *100(%)

0.7

1.5

Supported(p<.01)

Trained Carers (%)

61.6

83.1

Supported(p<.01)

% Migratory Care Staff

7.1

2.0

Supported(p<.01)

Turn-Over Rate of Staff (%)

6.8

2.7

Supported(p<.01)

The numbers of Seven Services

5.6

6.1

Supported(p<.05)
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Hypothesis 1d: There is a difference in ADL
level of residents received by government and
nongovernment elder care homes: Governmentowned elder care homes are likely to have fewer
residents with ADL impairments.

% of Residents that Need Feeding

26.9

18.4

Rejected

% of Residents that Need Dressing

58.3

50.6

Rejected

% of Residents that Need Help with
Moving

58.9

47.6

Rejected

Hypothesis 2: There is an association between the type of elder care homes (government vs. non-government) and health outcomes of care
quality.
Measures

Hypothesis 2a: Residents in government-owned
facilities are more likely to report lower levels of
mortality.

Hypothesis 2a: Residents in government-owned
facilities are more likely to report lower levels of
mortality.

Mean

Findings

NonGov.

Gov.

The Prevalence of Pressure Ulcer
(%)

.4

.1

Rejected

The Prevalence of Physical Restrain
Use (%)

4.7

9.4

Rejected

The Prevalence of Taking
Hypnotic (%)

16.2

21.8

Rejected

The Prevalence of Taking
Tranquilizer (%)

2.4

1.9

Rejected

Mortality Rate (%)

11.1

4.0

Supported(p<.01)

Predictors

Findings

The proportion of Daily Income from Residents’ Fee

Supported

The Proportion of Government’s Financial Support for Daily
Income

Supported
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CHAPTER 6 DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS
The main purpose of the study was to understand the relationship between ownership and
care quality in elder care homes. In this section, I attempt to use political economy theory to
discuss the relationship between ownership and aging within the context of Chinese political
economic and social cultural contexts, and individual’s aging experiences. Then, theoretical and
policy implications will be presented for future studies. Finally, limitations and research
implication of this study will be discussed.
6.1 Economic Resources as Important Predictors for Care Quality
From the data statistics in Table 1, government ownership was the dominant form among
elder care homes before 1990. After 1990, non government-owned elder care homes have rapidly
developed. Specifically, 70% of the nongovernment elder care homes were established after
2000. Non-government owned homes seem to gradually becoming the dominant form of elder
care homes. However, government-owned homes as shown in earlier research have higher
average number of beds and occupancy rate than non government-owned homes. In addition,
government-owned elder care homes, as shown in this study, have superiority in obtaining
economic resources from government, such as government’s investment when established, the
government’s financial support for daily income, and the amount of government’s subsidies for
every bed. Also shown in this study, government-owned elder care homes have better staffing
level in ratio of professional caregivers to residents, ratio of professional physicians to residents,
and percentage of trained care staff. However, non government-owned homes have higher
percentage of migratory care staff and turn-over rate. Government-owned facilities also provide
more services on average for residents compared to non government-owned.
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No differences was found between these two types of homes in resident characteristics,
which were identified when residents entered facilities and measured by the percentage of
residents with ADLs. Finally, Government-owned facilities have lower mortality rate than nongovernment-owned homes. But after controlling other four groups of variables, including
economic resources, staffing, the availability of services, and residents’ characteristics, the
correlation is not statistically significant. Two variables—the proportion of daily income charged
from residents and the proportion of government’s financial support for daily income—were
found statistically significant in predicting mortality rate.
These findings are consisted with results in previous study, in which government-owned
homes have advantages in obtaining financial support and having higher staffing level, compared
to non government-owned facilities (Zhan et al., 2006). Government-owned elder care homes
could have enough financial support from the government for establishment and daily income.
The stable financial support from the government is crucial for building good facilities, such as
having the sufficient number of beds. According the study of Zhan and her colleagues (2006),
elder care homes that are government-owned and government-funded tend to have better
equipments for residents, such as indoor toilets, shower, and elevators. In contrast, private homes,
some of which have the bed subsidies from government, tend to have simpler equipment and
worse residential condition. Furthermore, the differences of availability of services between two
different ownerships of homes were also influenced by government funding. Governmentowned elder care homes that have enough financial support would build more types of services
for residents, and non government-owned facilities that do not have enough financial support
would be limited to expand services.
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The inequality of economic resources, which could also influence the staffing level,
might bring up the salary gap for employees between government-owned and non governmentowned facilities (Zhan et al., 2006). The higher salary level would make the positions in
government-owned facilities more attractive for applicants and in-service staff. Thus, non
government-owned facilities, which have lower salary level, tend to have lower staffing level,
which was indicated by the lower ratio of professional caregivers and physicians to residents,
higher turn-over rate, and lower percentage of trained caregivers. Governmental funding would
ensure the financial support for the expenses of for training caregivers, hiring sufficient number
of staff, and reducing turn-over rate.
No difference was found in the three measures of residents’ characteristics between these
two types of elder care homes. This result does not lend support to the previous study in Nanjing
which concluded that non government-owned homes have higher level of residents’ needs for
assistance in ADLs than governmental homes (Feng et al., 2011). In the previous study, nongovernment owned homes tend to accept residents with sicker and higher needs for caregiving
than government-owned homes. The result in this study shared only marginal level of differences
in residents’ two counts of ADL activities. Further studies are needed to further explore this issue.
The sources of daily income between the two types of elder care facilities highly
predicted the mortality rate after controlling for other four groups of covariates. Governmentowned elder care homes, which have lower proportions of income from residents and higher
proportions from government funding, tend to have lower mortality rates. From the statistical
results in Table 2, 66% of government-owned facilities charged from residents, compared to 95.8%
of non government-owned facilities. Only 1.9% of non government-owned facilities obtained
financial support from government for daily income, compared to 30.2% of government-owned
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facilities. The differences indicated that government-owned facilities have superior financial
support to supplement daily income, while most non government-owned facilities could only
depend on the residents’ payments. One explanation for this result is that government-owned
elder care homes were likely to “be reserved exclusively for the upper class or newly rich
families as well as retired government cadres” (Zhan et al., 2006, p. 104). Government-owned
elder care homes also accepted social-welfare recipients (Zhan et al., 2006), who was similar to
Medicaid receivers in the United States. The social-welfare recipients often refers to persons
with “three no”, who had no income, no child and no ability to support oneself (Chen, 1996).
Due to the high service charges and limited admission, most elders with physical needs may have
few options for choosing government-owned facilities which provide better care.
Shown as in Table 7, whether from government support or individual fees, economic
resources are important predictors for mortality. As inequality increases in China, this could
mean that the rich could pay for higher quality of care. Or the powerful, such as government
official, are more likely to utilize government funded elder care home. This emerging social
inequality deserves more attention in future research.
6.2 Theoretical Implications
This study uses the insights from the political economical theory of aging. The variables
selected for this study are informed by the SPO framework. The link among structure, process,
and outcome was explored in this empirical study. This study only emphasized the relationship
between ownership and other measures in SPO framework. The future studies could explore
more relationship among those measures in SPO framework, such as causal correlation among
measures of structure, process, and outcome.
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As shown from the study, the distribution of economic resources influenced care quality,
and care quality differed by ownership. According to Estes (2001), government plays an
important role in distributing resources for social services. Individual aging experience is
influenced by inequality of resource distribution due to social policies determined by the
government. In this study, the Chinese government provides more financial support to
governmental elder care homes, and the inequality of funding is shown to influence the
differences in health outcomes of residents between governmental and nongovernmental elder
care homes.
The pension systems and insurance scheme may further influence individual aging
experiences. As more and more elders are likely to choose institutional care, elder-care facilities
are likely to be in greater demand due to reduced family size and available pension. Yet, as
shown, care quality in elder care homes are influenced by government funding. Combining these
factors, government policies are increasing the inequalities of distribution of economic resources
by first ensuring the interest of the government-own facilities in the hierarchy. With the rapid
development of economic since 1990s’s reform, Chinese government seems unprepared to take
over the responsibilities to corresponding reforms in social welfare systems (Chen, 1996; Chen,
2012). In the future, the Chinese government may need to minimize the inequality of resource
distribution in order to maximize quality of life for most aging individuals in China.
6.3 Policy Implications
With the increasing older population in China, elder care institutions have been
developing rapidly after 1990s. Quality control is also becoming an important issue. In their
study, Zhan and her colleagues (2006) found rooms in some elder care homes had more than 10

46
beds, and residents in those rooms had to share daily activities without dignity and privacy.
Quality issues in elder care homes have policy implications and deserve special attention.
First, there is no standardized approach to measure care quality in all institutions. The
department of Chinese governments that manage elder care homes should support the
development of quality measures and ensure the process of implementation and maintenance of
quality measures. In the United States, Minimum Data Set (MDS) and Online Survey
Certification and Reporting (OSCAR) are the two largest sources of nationwide data collection
for measuring care quality in nursing homes, and the former at residential level, and the latter at
staff level (Zhang et al., 2009). The performance of nursing homes could be improved according
to the reporting and analysis of data collected through administrative data. This could be a good
reference for measuring Chinese elder care in institutions.
Second, Chinese government could initiate programs that reward performances of elder
care homes through financial incentives, based on standardized measures of care quality. In the
United States, “pay for performance” programs, which intend to measure and reward better
performance of nursing homes and maximize the value of expenditure from public and private,
have been implemented in some states (Arling et al, 2009). The U.S. government had
traditionally regulated care quality through fines and sanctions toward poor care in facilities
(Arling et al, 2009). The approach of financial incentive such as pay-for-performance programs
could strive for high-quality care and make a good reference for improving care quality in
Chinese elder care homes.
Third, the results in this study raise the concern for government’s financial support for
private elder care homes. To ensure care quality, government financial support to nongovernment facilities may need to be increased. With the opening of free market for the industry
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of elder care homes, private homes have developed rapidly and become the dominant form to
meet the needs of most Chinese elders. Government has recently initiated some programs to
improve care quality and capacity of elder care homes, such as “Star Light Program” and
“Beloved Care Engineering” (Chu & Chi, 2008). Although government has made an effort to
meet the challenges of population aging in China, the aging of baby boomers could pose further
challenges in order to ensure the quality of care for the large number of aging baby boomers.
Finally, facilities for long term elder care in China could not be distinguished according
to provision of special care, due to the short development history of elder care industry (Zhan et
al., 2006). Unlike the U.S., the distinction between assisted living facilities and nursing homes in
China is missing. The lack of specification of elder care home is likely to increase the cost of
caregiving and to decrease care quality.
6.4 Limitations
This research uses a secondary data set and the questionnaire for data collection was not
specifically designed for this research. Thus analyses have to be performed based on available
variables in the data. This limitation of data may affect the interpretation of research results.
Furthermore, this study is based on one site—Tianjin, China, a large urban area.
Findings may not be representative of all cities in China due to geographic differences, level of
economic development, and difference in elderly dependency ratio. Tianjin, second to Shanghai,
has a very high proportion of the elderly population, and the number of elderly residing in elder
care institutions may be higher than other cities, especially interior ones. Consequently, the
results of this study may be more an understanding of the city itself; rather than nationally
representative results. Interpretation of the data and findings should take caution. Nevertheless,
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this study is one of the first to tackle the relationship between the state and the aging experiences
in China. It may provide insight for policy makers both in China and the US.
Finally, the data of this study was collected by self-report at a staff level; the results
might have ecological fallacy and information bias. For example, among 157 elder homes, only
19 homes reported pressure ulcer, and other homes reported the number of “0”. Pressure ulcer
was an important variable to indicate care quality, especially for bed-bound residents. The report
of clinic health outcomes by residents could greatly supplement the report from staff. This could
indicate under reporting of various quality measures in the study.
6.5 Research Implications
Limited information is available about long term care facilities in China. Being one of the
first studies about facility organizations, this study yields first hand data about long term care
facilities at aggregated level. Consequently, there are several major limitations. First, this
research is only a quantitative study at a facility level. Little is known about actual quality of care
from the perspectives of care-recipients or family members. Future research could collect
qualitative data to supplement quantitative study to allow a more in-depth understanding of
quality of care from various perspectives. Furthermore, the data for this study was only collected
in 2010, and a longitudinal study, or time-series study, could be designed to find differences in
quality of care over a period of time among different elder care homes. The long-term
investigation would yield more accurate data to allow a better understanding of the relationship
between government and non-government facilities in relation to care quality. After a certain
period of time, could market competition drive up the quality of care? Or quality of care
continues to rely on government funding? These questions can only be answered with time
through longitudinal studies. Findings to these questions will shed light not only for China, but

49
for other aging societies in models of long term care. Finally, because the measurements for this
study were established based on the United States’ setting, and some factors reflecting the
relationship in Chinese setting may have been omitted. Future research could develop a set of
measurements that are sensitive to the context of Chinese elder care homes.
6.6 Conclusions
This research aims to explore the inequality of the distribution of social resources for the
aged in the context of different-ownership nursing homes. The results indicate that the Chinese
government continues to play an important role in institutional long term care; in addition,
residents’ care quality and life quality is positively correlated with the government ownership of
facilities. Findings provide insights for government policy makers, researchers, and other
scholars for a greater understanding of factors influencing quality of care for older adults in
China.
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